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AMERICA'S EVOLVING STANCE ON MENTAL
RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Benjamin J. Clark*
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court refused to issue a categorical
Eighth Amendment ban on the execution of mentally retarded
defendants in Penry v. Lynaugh. 1 The Court then reversed this decision
in its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia. The Court found that the
country's standards of decency had evolved to such an extent that the
death penalty should not be available for mentally retarded defendants.2
This paper will examine these cases and the social evolution that
occurred after Penry, which spawned the legislative work products,
sentencing jury determinations, and the other criterion that the Court
found persuasive to issue such a categorical ban, a mere 13 years after
initially declining such a decision. It will then examine Justice Scalia's
blistering dissent in Atkins, and defend the majority's ruling from his
arguments. Then this paper will show how, in these cases, the Court
changed the way it brought "its own judgment to bear by asking
whether there is reason to agree or disagree with the judgment reached
by the citizenry and its legislators." 3 And, by examining Florida's
prohibition on the execution of mentally retarded defendants, this paper
will focus on one of the influential state statutes that contributed to the
Atkins decision. Finally, this paper will explore the legal definition of
"mentally retarded."
* B.A., Indiana University, J.D., DePaul College of Law, May 2003.
1Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329, 340 (1989).2Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304-05 (2002).31d.
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A COMPARISON OF THE RELEVANT CASES:
PENR Y AND A TKINS
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
In 1979, a Texas woman was brutally raped and murdered by Johnny
Paul Penry,4 a man with a substantially below average IQ estimated to
be 54.5 At Penry's competency hearing, a clinical psychologist
testified that the defendant had the mental capacity of a 6 year old
and the social maturity of a 9 or 10 year old, "which indicates mild to
moderate mental retardation."6  Nevertheless, he was found to be
mentally competent to stand trial.7 At trial in 1986, "[t]he jury rejected
Penry's insanity defense, convicted him of capital murder and
sentenced him to death.",8 He subsequently appealed.
In 19889, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered for
the first time the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment categorically
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded defendants. 10
The Penry 2-part test
The Penry Court looked at and questioned the execution of mentally
retarded people using two different standards to determine whether it
would be considered cruel and unusual, and therefore, prohibited by the
4CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 273 (Randall Coye & Lyn Entzeroth
eds., 2d ed. 2001) Editor's note stating: Johnny Paul Penry's mental problems started at birth.
A difficult breach delivery left Penry with organic brain damage. His condition was aggravated
during early childhood by his mother's brutal beatings. She struck Penry on the head, broke his
arm several times, burned him with cigarette butts, and forced him to eat his own feces and
drink urine. Penry's neighbors recalled hearing 'terrible, terrible screams' coming from the
Penry house every afternoon. Penry dropped out of the first grade and when he reached
adulthood his mental age was still comparable to the average second-grader's. As an
adolescent, Penry was unable to recite the alphabet and could not count.
At age 21, Penry was convicted of rape and was eventually was paroled. A report from
the Texas Rehabilitation Commission warned that he had 'very poor coordination between
body drives and intellectual control. He also tends to be very defensive and may tend to protect
himself from anticipation of hurt from others through aggressive acts.'
During Penry's trial ... 'it became clear [that Penry] couldn't read or write ... He
couldn't say how many nickels were in a dime or name the President of the United States."5Penry, 492 U.S. at 308.
6Id. at 307-08.
7Id.
'Id. at 310.
9 d. at 312-13. The Supreme Court actually denied certiorari on direct review in 1986.
Penry then filed this habeas corpus petition challenging the death sentence by arguing his
Eighth Amendment rights were violated by unsatisfactory jury instructions. The District Court
denied relief, as did the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari in 1988 to
decide, among other issues, whether it is "cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to execute a mentally retarded person with Penry's reasoning ability."
l°Penry, 492 U.S. at 313.
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Eighth Amendment." First, it looked to determine whether such
punishment was considered cruel and unusual at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. 12 If the evidence was insufficient under
the first standard, the punishment could still be considered cruel and
unusual by the Court under the second standard, if it violated the
"evolvin standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."
When it examined the first standard, the Court, taking into
consideration cruel and unusual punishment at the time of the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, acknowledged that there had been common law
bans on the punishment of "idiots" and "lunatics."' 4  However, the
majority noted that these terms were synonymous with modem
definitions of insanity and only the most severe cases of mental
retardation.' 5 This standard did not help Penry who was found to have
a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him," and thus, was found competent to stand trial.' 6 Because he was
considered capable of understanding the consequences of his actions,
he did not fall amongst the class of persons who may have been
protected from execution because they were considered "idiots" or
"lunatics" at common law. 17 Nevertheless, the Court found Penry to be
mildly mentally retarded, and declared that there was a lack of evidence
showing that the practice of executing a person of mild or moderate
retardation would be considered cruel and unusual at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.' 8
Despite the fact that the Court did not consider this punishment
cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
Court could still find the punishment to be unconstitutionally excessive
if the nation's "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."' 9 Under the second standard, the Court looked first
and foremost at legislative work product for evidence of such standards
of decency, and then to "data concerning the actions of sentencing
"Id. at 330-31.
1Id. at 330.
131d. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).
I41d. at 333.
" Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
16Id. at 333 citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
'
71d.
"ld. at 334-345.
19Id. at 330-31 quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); Ford,
477 U.S. at 406.
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juries., 20  Accordingly, the Penry Court found that there was
insufficient evidence to show that the execution of a mildly mentally
retarded person, such as Penry, would violate the country's evolving
standards of decency at that time.21 The Court found that there was
insufficient evidence to support Penry's claim that "there [was] an
emerging national consensus against executing the mentally retarded,"
and noted that only one state had banned the execution of mentally
retarded defendants, aside from the fourteen states that had completely
banned the practice of capital punishment. Further, it found the
evidence insufficient to support the contention that the country's
standards of decency categorically rejected such executions.2 3 Thus,
the Court's application of the second standard did not help Penry's
plight either.
However, the Penry Court left open the possibility of a reversal of
its decision if empirical evidence of such a national consensus were to
arise. After noting that valid public opinion polls showed that a
sizeable majority of citizens from states that allowed the death penalty
were opposed to the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the Court
concluded, "[b]ut atpresent, there is insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people. 24  This
language suggests it may be appropriate to review this issue again in
the future, if evidence of a national consensus against this penalty
emerges.
20 Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (plurality opinion).
21Id. at 335.22/d. at 333-34.
23Id. at 334-35. As a basis for comparison, the Court noted that Ford v. Wainwright,
which held the Eighth Amendment bans the execution of the insane, had considerably more
evidence of a national consensus against such punishment as no state allowed the execution of
the insane and 26 states had explicit statutory bans on such punishment. Id. at 334 citing Ford,
477 U.S. at 408.
24 Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
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Atkins v. Virginia, 492 U.S. 304 (2002)
In 2002, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in the case of Atkins v.
Virginia.25  In light of new evidence of an emerging national trend
against allowing the execution of mentally retarded defendants, the
Atkins Court held that it would be considered cruel and unusual
punishment, and would be prohibited under the Eighth Amendment.2
6
The Atkins Court applied the Penry test, and looked to statutes for
piecemeal evidence of a national consensus, which had held such
27punishment to be excessive. In contrast to the Penry Court, and
perhaps in response to the Penry decision, the Atkins Court found a
significant number of state legislatures that no longer administered
capital punishment to the mentally retarded.28 In its decision, the Court
noted that after Penry, every legislature that addressed the issue had
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.29 Accordingly, the
Court observed, "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. 3 °
In addition, the Court found that even in states that allowed
execution of mentally retarded persons, the practice was not commonly
imposed by juries.' For example, in New Hampshire, capital
punishment was available for mentally retarded offenders, but it had
not been imposed in decades. 32 Moreover, since Penry, only five states
had executed offenders with a known IQ of less than 70.33 The Court
found the juries' reluctance to impose the death penalty upon the
mentally retarded to be significant evidence of the public's aversion to
the practice, and concluded that "[t]he practice, therefore, has become
truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it." 34 This movement was perceived by the Court as
a national declaration that the mentally retarded were less culpable than
25Atkins, 536 U.S. at 30426 d. at 311-21.27Id.
28 d. at 314-16. The Court noted the work product of 21 state legislatures that banned the
practice of executing the mentally retarded. Georgia and Maryland were the first states to
statutorily prohibit such punishment, and Congress enacted a similar ban for the federal death
penalty. Id. "In 1990, Kentucky and Tennessee enacted statutes similar to those in Georgia and
Maryland, as did New Mexico in 1991 and Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and
Kansas in 1993 and 1994. In 1995, when New York reinstated its death penalty, it emulated the
Federal Government by expressly exempting the mentally retarded." Id. at 314.
29 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.30 d. at 315.
3 Id. at 316.321d.
331d.
34Id.
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the average criminal, and that they should not be executed.35
Accordingly, the Atkins Court categorically banned the practice of
executing the mentally retarded.
Excessive because of a lack of retribution and deterrence
The Court in Atkins held that retribution and deterrence, the two
principle societal functions that the death penalty is supposed to
achieve, are undermined when applied to the mentally retarded.36 In
assessing the function of retribution, the Court noted that "the severity
of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of
the offender."37 When applied to a mentally retarded defendant, the
Court reasoned that the function of retribution is considerably broken
down and the punishment will be excessive because the defendant's
culpability is diminished.38 A punishment is excessive and prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment "if it is not graduated and apportioned to the
offense." Taking into consideration the reduced ability of mentally
retarded defendants to form the most heightened criminal intent, the
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty to mentally retarded
defendants would be excessive because the offense is not committed
with the premeditation and deliberation that justifies putting them to
death.4 °
Additionally, the intended purpose of deterrence is also hindered
when the death penalty is administered to the mentally retarded,
because inherent in mental retardation is the inability to learn from
experience, reason logically, and control impulses. 41 In view of that,
the Court in Atkins found that mentally retarded people generally do not
fully understand that their actions may cause the imposition of
punishments such as imprisonment or execution.42  Without an
understanding of those basic concepts of punishment, a mentally
retarded person cannot understand the possibility of being executed 43 so
it does not effectively deter them from committing criminal acts.
The Atkins Court found this wave of negative reaction toward the
execution of mentally retarded defendants to be evidence of the
35Akins, 536 U.S. at 318.
3 6 1d. at 318-19.
371d. at 319.38Id.
39Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
4
°Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.411d. at 320.
421d.
431d.
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country's prevailing standards of decency. 44  It held that "such
punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive
restriction on the state's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded
offender," and therefore, categorically banned the application of the
death penalty to mentally retarded defendants. 45
In Defense of the Majority from Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from the majority's decision to
categorically ban the imposition of capital punishment upon mentally
46retarded defendants. He argued that the mentally retarded have no
diminished personal culpability, and that the societal functions of
deterrence and retribution are not substantially diminished when the
death penalty is applied to this class of individuals.47 The decision of
whether to execute any defendant properly resides with juries, argued
Scalia, and the majority's decision effectively usurps their role.48
Further, he contended that there was a lack of conclusive evidence to
show the existence of a national consensus in opposition of the
execution of the mentally retarded. In addition, he rejected the
majority's finding that mentally retarded defendants frequently lack the
ability to effectively participate in the criminal justice system.49 This
section will respond to each of Scalia's arguments, and will defend the
majority's holding that the mentally retarded should be shielded from
the application of the death penalty.
Disadvantages of the mentally retarded
throughout the criminal justice system
The first response will be to Justice Scalia's argument that the mentally
retarded are able to effectively participate in the criminal justice system
and therefore should not be given special treatment.5 ° This argument is
flawed because Scalia fails to consider that the mentally retarded have
inherent disadvantages throughout all phases of the trial, which start as
"Id. at 405.45 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
46Atkins was decided by a judicial line-up of 6-3. The majority opinion was written by
Justice Stevens. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice Scalia
and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia dissented and filed an opinion in which Chief Rehnquist and
Thomas joined.47Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350-52 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
48See id. at 221, quoting 1 Pleas of the Crown, at 32-33.
49Id. at 342-348.
501d.
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early as the police investigation.51 The mentally retarded are generally
very responsive to coercion, and may be easily agitated when detained,
even if they have done nothing wrong.52  This responsiveness may
account for suspicious behavior of the mentally retarded suspect, and
may also cause him to falsely confess.5 3  "Because of his impaired
thought process, the suspect erroneously accepts guilt, assuming that
the police officer's allegation presupposes his responsibility in
perpetuating the crime. Therefore, he confesses to a crime he did not
commit, thereby 'corroborating' the police officer's belief in his
culpability." 54  Additionally, the mentally retarded are less likely to
understand their Miranda rights, "but because of the inclination to
answer questions in affirmatively, [the mentally retarded defendant]
will often say that he understands the Miranda rights," even when he
does not.55 Mental retardation may therefore hinder the effect of the
defendant's Miranda warnings, depriving him of a necessary legal
safeguard designed to protect him from administering incriminating
confessions. Mentally retarded people are among the most vulnerable
class of persons, despite Justice Scalia's opinion, so it is proper to
afford them protection considering the enormous impact confessions
usually have at trial.
The mentally retarded defendant may also have difficulty building
a proper defense due to a very poor memory, which is a common
component of mental retardation. "This impediment, coupled with
the tendency to fall prey to others' suggestions, renders communication
of the facts, especially the most mitigating facts, to the defense lawyer
next to impossible. 5 7
And at trial, the mentally retarded defendant frequently and
unavoidably acts in ways that seem highly inappropriate for the
5 1Joseph A. Nese, Jr., The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination of the
Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DuQ. L. REv. 373, 380-81
(2002).
52Id. at 381 (2002).531d.
541d. (citing ROSA ENRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH
PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, 13 HUM. RTS. WATCH No. 1 (G), 24
(Malcolm Smart & Cynthia Brown eds., 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/pbsjanjun2k1.htm).
55Id. at 382.
56Id. at 383.57Nese, supra note 43, at 383, citing Texas Defender Service, A State of Denial: Texas
Justice and the Death Penalty, at
http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/studies/texasdefenders/chapter5.vtml#N71 (last visited Jul. 28,
2001).
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situation.58 For example, he might sleep, smile, or become restless at
points in the trial that' seem totally inappropriate to the average
person. 59 Juries might see this and misinterpret this behavior for a lack
of remorse or compassion for the victim.60 To compound this problem,
"[flew lawyers have received special training in communicating with a
mentally challenged client, and many lawyers do not want to spend the
time explaining the different stages of a case in unsophisticated
language, appropriately simplified for their clients to comprehend.
'6 1
Diminished personal culpability
In refuting the majority's contention that the deficiencies of mentally
retarded people "do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions,
but they do diminish their personal culpability," 62 Scalia charged that
"[o]nce the Court admits (as it does) that mental retardation does not
render the offender morally blameless there is no basis for saying that
the death penalty is never appropriate retribution."
63
However, since Gregg v. Georgia, the Court has referred to the
death penalty as an "extreme sanction" 64 that should be confined to a
"narrow category of the most serious crimes." 65  The Gregg Court
stated that "a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance" is necessary to
ensure that the deathpenalty is "not be[ing] imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner."6  Inherent in this statement is the suggestion that
the States' statutes governing the death penalty must shield the public
from an arbitrary and capricious application by narrowly tailoring these
statutes in a way that protects society's weakest and most defenseless
classes. There are few, if any, classes of people that can be categorized
as more vulnerable than the mentally retarded. Arguably, they are
more easily manipulated and exploited than any other class of
defendants, and as such it is imperative that they receive protection
from arbitrary and capricious applications of the death penalty.
Therefore, despite Scalia's dissent, the Court's decision in Gregg
581d.
591d.601d.
61Id. citing Texas Defender Service, A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death
Penalty, at http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/studies/texasdefenders/chapter5.vtml#N71 (last
visited Jul. 28, 2001).62Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350-52. at 318 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
6 3 1d. at 351 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
64Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).65Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
66Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95.
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shows that such extreme sanctions should not be applied to such
vulnerable groups of defendants.
Another argument Justice Scalia made against the majority's
assertion was that the diminished mental capacities of mentally retarded
offenders make them categorically less culpable. He asserted:
I am not sure that a murderer is somehow less blameworthy
if (though he knew his act was wrong) he did not fully
appreciate that he could die for it; but if so, we should treat a
mentally retarded murderer the way we treat an offender
who may be 'less likely' to respond to the death penalty
because he was abused as a child. We do not hold him
immune from capital punishment, but require his
background to be considered by the sentencer as a mitigating
factor.67
This argument is callous and deeply insensitive to the difficulties
of mentally retarded persons. It ignores the complicated mental
difficulties they experience in comparison to the rest of society. Also,
it neglects the premise that "[s]ince a mentally retarded person is of
lower intelligence and has reduced ability in language, ability to control
impulsively, self-concept, self-perception, moral development,
knowledge of basic facts, and motivation, it is unlikely that such an
individual could possess the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of
murder." 68  Ultimately, this position shows that Scalia lacks
compassion; he leaves out any human component in his reasoning for a
decision that has everything to do human fragility.
Deterrence and retribution
In his dissent, Justice Scalia also rejects the majority's claim that the
social function of retribution is significantly diminished when applied
to the mentally retarded due to their reduced culpability.69 He then
ridicules the majority's stance that deterrence, the other primary
societal function of the death penalty, also fails due to the defendant's
inability to learn from experience and think logically.7 ° In support of
671d. at 352, citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-17 (1982).
68Lindsay Raphel, Have American Standards of Decency Evolved to the Point Where
Capital Punishment Inflicted upon the Mentally Retarded Can No Longer Be Tolerated? 26
NOVA L. REV. 269, 284-85 (2001) ("For a defendant to be sentenced to death, the sentencer, at
a minimum, must conclude that either the defendant intended to kill the victim and knew that
there was a possibility that the victim could die, or was reckless and acted without excuse.").69Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351.
7
°Id. at 351.
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his position, Scalia stated, "even the Court does not say that all
mentally retarded individuals cannot 'process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and... control their conduct based
upon that information'; it merely asserts that they are 'less likely' to be
able to do so."
71
However, Scalia has misapplied the Courts statement. The
majority's point is not that all the members of a generally weak and
vulnerable class of people must be totally unable to understand the
consequences of their action before the Court may act to protect the
class. Given the disadvantages mentally retarded defendants may
experience throughout the criminal justice system, the Court is right to
protect them from unconstitutionally excessive punishments. Special
steps must be taken to safeguard more vulnerable factions of the public
from wrongful imposition of the death penalty. The holding of Atkins
serves this purpose.
Proper role ofjuries
In his dissent, Justice Scalia then ridiculed the majority for imposing
the prohibition because he said that it depicts the judges and juries as
unable to fully understand mental retardation. This, he stated,
"contradicts the immemorial belief, here and in England, that they play
an indispensable role in such matters., 72  Such criticism seems
misguided, however, as the prohibition does not dispense with the role
of the jury and judge. As shown later in the discussion of the Florida
prohibition, capital trials now can have two stages where the defendant
may be found mentally retarded, and therefore ineligible for the death
penalty. The defendant may be found mentally retarded first by the
trial jury. The defendant then has a second opportunity to be found
mentally retarded by the court after it is advised by court-appointed
professionals.
If the jury finds that the defendant's diminished mental capacity
reduces his personal culpability, and refuses to sentence him to death,
the jury's role has not been dispensed with or neglected. But even if
the jury sentences the defendant to death, and the court later evaluates
the defendant and finds him to be mentally retarded, the thrust of the
jury's declaration remains intact. Despite his exoneration, the prisoner
is would still be found guilty of the crime, and would be punished.
Therefore, in these situations, only the death sentence is vacated, and
not the finding of guilt.
71/d.
72Id. at 349.
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Conclusive evidence of a national consensus against the punishment
Also flawed is Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's decision, in
which he argues that there is a lack of legislative proof of a national
consensus against the execution of mentally retarded offenders. He
argues that only 47 percent of the states to which the issue was
presented voted to prohibit, and that it would be absurd to conclude a
consensus has been reached.73 His analysis, however, does not portray
the full picture because it fails to include all the states. While it may be
true that only eighteen states have enacted legislation banning the
practice, Scalia neglected to include twelve states that have completely
banned capital punishment.74  Adding these twelve states to the
eighteen states that only prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded,
establishes that the legislatures of thirty out of fifty states have rejected
the execution of mentally retarded defendants. When considering the
"national consensus," it is improper to not include all the states in the
nation. 7
5
Furthermore, unlike Scalia, the majority did not base its decision
solely upon the work product of state legislatures, but also looked to the
sentencing patterns of juries and public opinion polls, for indications of
a national consensus. These sources weighed strongly in favor of
banning the execution of the mentally retarded.76 Justice Scalia,
however, refuted the majority's assertion in his dissent when he stated:
"It is not so much the number of these states [that have enacted
legislation prohibiting executing mentally retarded offenders] that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. 77  He
remarked, "[b]ut in what other direction could we possibly see
change? 7
8
His responses to the argument are unconvincing and evasive as
there are several other directions we could see change. The most
obvious example is to take account of the states that have addressed the
issue and voted not to prohibit executing mentally retarded defendants.
That has never occurred. In fact, every legislature that has addressed
the issue has voted overwhelmingly in favor of prohibiting the
practice.79 Also, no state legislature has voted to reinstate the power to
731d.
74Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351.751d.
76 Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-35.77Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J. dissenting).78Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-35.
7 9 d. at 316.
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perform such executions. Another consideration is anti-crime
legislation that is considerably more popular than legislation that
protects defendants that are found guilty of violent crimes.81 This wave
of legislation carries substantial weight.
82
It is clear that Justice Scalia is minimizing the fact that after
Penry, state legislatures began to address this issue and that, given the
opportunity, legislatures have unanimously declared that our society
views mentally retarded persons as categorically less culpable than
average criminals. Taking all relevant facts into consideration clearly
presents a national consensus that finds the execution of mentally
retarded offenders improper.
83
The Court's Own Judgment: How it Differed in Both Cases
After looking to the Eighth Amendment, the Bill of Rights at the time it
was adopted, the Supreme Court may bring its own judgment to bear
"by asking whether there is reason to agree or disagree with judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators. ' 84 The Court exercised this
option in both Penry and Atkins. But more importantly, is how the
Court handled this responsibility when dealing with this issue.
In response to Penry's argument that his diminished mental
capacity made him incapable of acting with the degree of culpability
that can justify the ultimate penalty, Justice O'Connor wrote: "I cannot
conclude that all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability - by virtue
of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized
consideration of their personal responsibility - inevitably lack the
cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of
culpability associated with the death penalty."85 O'Connor further
stated that the differences in mentally retarded people can vary
greatly.86 Consequently, she concluded that to hold that they all lack
the ability to form the proper mental capacity for the administration of
the death penalty would be wrong.
87
Penry's argument was also rejected because it relied heavily on
"the concept of 'mental age,' and to hold that execution of any person
with a mental age of seven or below would constitute cruel and unusual
8Id. at 315-16.
8 1Id.
83Penry, 492 U.S. at 314-16.84Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
85Penry, 492 U.S. at 338.86Id.
871d.
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punishment., 88 The theory of mental age was found to be problematic
because it was imprecise and misleading. 89  And because of the
defendant's mental age, the Court declined to issue a categorical ban on
the execution of mentally retarded offenders in Penry.90
Interestingly, in Atkins, O'Connor did not reassert her rejection of
the view that all mentally retarded people lack the mental capacity to
form the criminal intent necessary to impose the death penalty.
O'Connor did not argue in Atkins, as she did in Penry, that a categorical
ban would be overly broad. There was no examination of whether such
a rule went too far to shelter mentally retarded people at all.
Instead, when the Atkins Court brought its own judgment to bear
"by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators," 9' it focused on the wave of
legislative work product that came forth after Penry. The Court
recognized the consistency with which the state legislatures acted and
examined patterns in jury sentencing, as juries consistently refused to
administer the death penalty to mentally retarded defendants. 92
In Atkins, the Court determined that the only obstacle preventing a
categorical ban would be determining and defining "which offenders
are in fact retarded., 93 The Court dealt with this problem by refusing to
offer a national definition of the term "mentally retarded," and left it up
to the states to "develop appropriate ways to enforce [this]
constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences." 94
EXAMINATION OF THE FLORIDA PROHIBITION
In 2001, the Florida legislature enacted a prohibition against executing
the mentally retarded.95 After the Penry decision, Florida's new law
became important for the message it sent and the national trend it
marked, as the states continued to cast their vote against such practice.
It is therefore appropriate to look closely at Florida Statute Section
921.137, titled "Imposition of the death sentence upon a mentally
retarded defendant prohibited., 96
881d. at 339.
891d
90Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
91Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
9 21d. at 313-317.
9 31d. at 317.941d.
9 5FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (2002).96Id.
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The first section of the statute offers definitions to terms such as
"mental retardation"97  and "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning."98 Although the statute does not explicitly state how low a
person's IQ must be to qualify under the term "mentally retarded,"
legislative employees found that the bill would likely spare any inmate
with an IQ of 70 or less.99  As a guideline in defining degrees of
severity of mental disorders, the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV")
states that,
an individual is mentally retarded when, prior to attaining
the age of eighteen, he exhibits A) significant subaverage
intellectual functioning: an IQ of approximately seventy or
below on an individually administered IQ test; [and] B)
concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive
functioning . . . in at least two of the following areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety.100
The second section of the Florida Statute, expressly states that
persons found to be mentally retarded may not be sentenced to death.' 01
Sections 921.137(3) and 921.137(4) deal with procedural aspects of the
prohibition. 0 2 For example, section 921.137(3) provides that capitally
charged defendants intending to raise mental retardation as a bar to the
death sentence must provide notice during the penalty phase of the
trial.10 3 Under section 921.137(4), if a defendant has given such notice
as required in 921.137(3) and subsequently received a death sentence,
971d. at § 921.137(1) (2002). Subsection 1 of Florida Statute § 921.137 explains: "As
used in this section, the term 'mental retardation' means significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested
during the period from conception to age 18."
98d. The same section defines "the term 'significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning,' for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard
deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the
Department of Children and Family Services." Id.
99 Raphel, supra note 60, at 274 (citing ROSA ENRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, BEYOND
REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, 13 HUM. RTS.
WATCH No. I(G), 2 (Malcolm Smart & Cynthia Brown eds., 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/pbsjanjun2k1.htm).
I00AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, 46 (4th ed. 1994).
10 1FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(2) (2002).
102FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.137(3)(4) (2002).
1031d.
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he may "file a motion to determine whether the defendant has mental
retardation."' 0 4 The statute then requires that the court appoint "two
experts in the field of mental retardation" to evaluate the defendant and
advise the court of their findings.' 0 5 If, after being advised, the court
finds the defendant is mentally retarded, the defendant may not be
sentenced to death.1
0 6
The third and fourth sections of the statute essentially give the
capitally charged defendant two chances of avoiding the death sentence
because of his or her impaired mental capacity. When the defendant
brings up his purported mental retardation at the trial level, the jury will
likely be given supplemental instructions to consider mitigating
circumstances in assessing whether to impose the death penalty. In
these instructions, mitigating circumstances are frequently defined to
jurors as "any aspect of the defendant's character and record or
circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a death
sentence inappropriate in this case."'10 8 This allows the jury the first
chance to decide whether the defendant's diminished mental capacity
reduces his personal culpability to the extent that the death penalty
should not be applied. But even if the jury sentences the defendant, the
defendant has a second option which allows him or her to then petition
the court for an expert evaluation.
10 9
Defining "mentally retarded"
The Atkins Court declared a categorical ban on the execution of the
mentally retarded, but it declined to prescribe a national definition for
the term "mentally retarded." While it made clear that the decision
applied to all defendants that "fall within the range of mentally retarded
about whom there is a national consensus,"' 1 0 the Court left the term
"mentally retarded" to be defined by the states."' It stated, "[a]s with
our approach in Ford v. Wainwright with regard to insanity, 'we leave
to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."' 1 12
104Id.
1051d.
1061d.
"'
0 Penry, 294 U.S. at 309-10
081d. (This is a quotation from the instructions given to the jury in Penry.)
t09Atkins, 536.U.S. at 317.
10 d.
11ld
"
112Id.
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The Importance of the DSM-IV and the AAMR Guidelines
Many states have adopted the guidelines of the DSM-IV, which is a
comprehensive classification and reference manual on mental
disorders, their manifestations, and treatments administered by the
American Psychiatric Association." 3 According to the DSM-IV,
"...the mentally retarded individual is
someone who has 'significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning'
accompanied with 'significant limitations in
adaptive functioning in at least two of the
following skills areas: communication, self-
care, home living, social/interpersonal skills,
use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety." 1
4
These conditions must be exhibited by the time the person reaches the
age of eighteen for a person to be considered mentally retarded. "5
The DSM-IV offers Intelligence Quotient ("IQ") scores to
characterize the term "significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning" for the purposes of defining mental retardation.
16
Whether the defendant has the requisite limited intellectual functioning
required to be clinically considered "mentally retarded" "is the pivotal
component of any individual's diagnosis."" 7 The DSM-IV states that
IQ scores of 50 to approximately 70 are indicative of persons that
suffer from mild mental retardation." 8  IQ scores of 35 to
approximately 50 are indicative of persons that suffer from moderate
mental retardation. 1 9  IQ scores of 25 to approximately 50 are
indicative of persons that suffer from severe mental retardation, and IQ
scores below 25 are indicative of persons that suffer from profound
113Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting
the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death
Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REv. 911, 913 (2001) (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 39 (4th ed. 1994)) [hereinafter
DSM-IV].114Id.
"'Id. at 915.
6Id. at 914.
117 James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, p.7, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.
118 Id. at 7.
119 Id.
2003]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
mental retardation. 120  "The DSM-IV notes that individuals with IQ
scores in the range of seventy-one to seventy-five also may be mentally
retarded if they have significant deficits in adaptive functioning."'
2 1
While the defendant's limited intellectual functioning is the
pivotal component of the determination of whether he will be
considered "mentally retarded," there are other things in addition to a
subaverage IQ score that should be considered before a person can be
classified as mentally retarded. 122 "As much as the criminal justice
system might prefer to have a hard-and-fast limitation measurable by a
single IQ score, it is simply impossible to exclude consideration of
other factors about the testing performed on the individual, nor is it
possible to ignore the need for clinical judgment by experienced
diagnosticians."'123 "Adaptive behavior" is one component to consider
which will ensure that the individual is not merely a poor test taker, but
rather is a disabled individual.
124
Another component of the defendant's mental characterization is
the "age of onset." 125  To be considered mentally retarded, the
defendant's limited mentally capacity generally must have been
manifested by age 18.126 This allows one to distinguish mental
retardation from other forms of brain damage that occur later in life. 127
"This distinction is considerably more relevant to clinicians designing
habilitation plans and systems of supports for an individual than it is for
the criminal justice system, since later occurring disabilities ... would
involve comparable reduction in culpability for any criminal act." 128
In addition to the DSM-IV, the other primary source of guidelines
adopted by states is the American Association of Mental Retardation,
which prescribes similar standards for determining mental
retardation. 29 "According to the AAMR, a person is deemed mentally
retarded if he or she has: (1) an IQ below 70-75, (2) concurrently
existing with limitations in two or more adaptive skills areas, (3) which
is manifested by age eighteen."' ' 30  The variations between the
American Association of Mental Retardation and DSM-IV differ only
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Ellis, supra note 117, at 7.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 9.
126 Id.
127 Ellis, supra note 117, at 7.
128 Entzeroth, supra note 113, at 9.
129 Id. at 7.
130 Id.
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in semantics. 131 Thus, "[i]t is important to realize that the various
formulations describe the same group of individuals, and therefore do
not differ in scope in any significant way."''
32
The Effect of Atkins
It is difficult to say, with any degree of accuracy, how many death row
inmates Atkins will save from execution. Because the Atkins Court left
"to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences,,'1 33 each
state has the ability to decide whether it will use the Atkins decision to
retroactively save mentally retarded inmates that have been sentenced
to death before the categorical ban was issued. "Several of the states
that had enacted statutes prior to Atkins included a provision that the
law would only apply to prosecutions subsequent to the laws effective
date. Other state laws were silent on the subject."' 134  As state
legislatures enact their own statutes prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded defendants in response to Atkins, each state will be
forced to balance the importance of executing only those who deserve
such sentences with the interest of protecting themselves from the wave
of law suits from death row inmates with subaverage intelligence,
arguing they are mentally retarded to save themselves from execution.
CONCLUSION
Only twelve years passed between Penry and Atkins, but in that span
the reaction to Penry was so profound that the Supreme Court reversed
its ruling and categorically banned the execution of the mentally
retarded. After Penry, there was quick action to defend the mentally
retarded, primarily through state legislatures, but also through juries
and opinion polls. The wave of legislative action Penry spawned made
it clear that many people considered the mentally retarded to be a class
of persons that needed to be protected from the most severe punishment
administered.
Given the foregoing, it was proper for the Penry Court to reject the
categorical ban. The Supreme Court was not in the proper position to
create such a law before the state legislatures had shown the existence
131 id.
132 Ellis, supra note 117, at 5.
133 Atkins, 536.U.S. at 317 quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17
(1986).
134 Id.
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of a national consensus. The Court thus stated that it could not reach
that conclusion at that time. This called for the states to speak up and
take a stance with legislative actions or inactions. The enactment of
legislation is perhaps the best way for the American people to voice
their positions on this issue.
Further, the Atkins Court was right to grant certiorari when it did.
It did so only after a majority of the states that had allowed the death
penalty decided to discontinue that practice in a brief period of time.
Given the sudden and widespread change in legislation, the Court acted
appropriately in deciding that this is a punishment that the people may
feel strongly opposed to, therefore the thorough examination of the
issue, via Atkins, was appropriate. The Atkins decision clearly reflects
the view that executing mentally retarded defendants is a practice that
offends a majority of Americans, and should be categorically banned
by the nation as a whole.
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